Articles Posted in Oil and Gas Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently decided the case of Breton Energy, L.L.C., et al. v. Mariner Energy Resources, Inc., et al which concerned claims of waste and drainage against Defendants who were operators of a neighboring mineral lease. The issue was whether the Plaintiffs sufficiently plead a claim for relief against each Defendant. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the claims of drainage against all Defendants should be dismissed, and the claims of waste should be dismissed as to all but one Defendant, IP Petroleum Co. (“IP”).

The Facts
Conn Energy, Inc. (“Conn”) owned a mineral lease named West Cameron 171 (“WC 171”) in the Gulf of Mexico. In 2009, Conn had an agreement with Breton Energy, LLC (“Breton”), allowing Breton to explore WC 171 for hydrocarbons. Conn and Breton sued the owners and operators of a neighboring lease called West Cameron 172 (“WC 172”). It was significant in this case that the WC 171 and the WC 172 shared a hydrocarbon reservoir: the K-1 sands. The other Defendants were other lease owners and operators or predecessors or successors to the current operators.

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Previously I have discussed the revised Texas Railroad Commission (RRC) Rule 3.70 regarding permits for pipelines. You can access my previous blogs here and here. The RRC approved that new rule on December 3. 2014, and it went into effect on March 1, 2015. You can access the text of the new rule here.

There were many comments and suggestions made during the Public Comment period required by Texas law for any new administrative rule. The RRC included a few of these suggestions in the revised rule. However, there were a number of important comments and requests that were neither significantly addressed nor included in the revised rule. These include:

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An interesting case that involved easements was recently decided by the Texas Supreme Court. The case is David Hamrick, et al. v. Tom Ward and Betsy Ward and the issue presented to the Court was whether an implied easement of necessity by prior use continues after the necessity has ended. There are two basic types of easements. Express easements, that are created by an agreement (usually written) and implied easements, that arise by operation of the law due to certain specific facts. In Texas, implied easements are split further into a number of subcategories, including easements of necessity and easements by prior use.

The Facts
In 1936 O.J. Bourgeois owned certain property in Harris County, Texas. Mr. Bourgeois gave two acres of the land to his grandson. While the grandson owned this land, a dirt road was built across Mr. Bourgeois’ remaining property to allow the grandson access to the public road. Subsequent owners of the grandson’s property also used the dirt road for access. Eighty years later, Tom and Betsy Ward were the owners of the grandson’s land and still used the dirt road. The Wards put gravel on the road so they could use it for construction of a new house on their property. The Hamricks owned the land that the dirt road crosses, formerly the property of Mr. Bourgeois. The Hamricks filed a lawsuit asking for a temporary injunction preventing the Wards from using this road. The temporary injunction was granted in April 2006. So as not to delay construction of their new house, the Wards built a new driveway to access the main road. In the suit, the Wards requested a declaratory judgment that they had an implied easement for the dirt road. The trial court granted the Wards motion for summary judgment and the Court of Appeals agreed and held that the Wards had a prior use easement across the Hamricks land.

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Steve Lipsky and his wife Shyla became famous as Texas landowners who claimed they could set their water on fire–and they alleged this was due to methane contamination from nearby hydraulic fracturing. The couple sued Range Resources who operated a well near their house in Weatherford, Texas. The Lipskys claimed they noticed problems with their water after Range drilled two natural gas wells near their house in 2009.

The Environmental Protection Agency, without any scientific basis whatsoever, concluded that Range had caused or contributed to the water contamination. The Railroad Commission of Texas did actual did scientific testing and determined that the methane came from a shallower rock formation than the one drilled, and allowed production at the wells to continue. Many people do not realize that methane occurs naturally in many water deposits, but is not drawn into the water pump until the water level falls below a certain level. With lots of fanfare, the EPA sued Range Resources in federal court for the alleged contamination. That suit was later quietly dismissed in its entirety.

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A federal appellate court decision demonstrates some lessons for Texas mineral owners. That decision was issued by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Breton Energy, L.L.C., et al. v. Mariner Energy Resources, Inc., et al. The Plaintiffs in this case own and operate an off-shore lease in the Gulf of Mexico that includes an area known as the K-1 sands. The Defendants own and operate an adjacent off-shore lease that covers an area known as the K-2 sands. The Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants engaged in “unlawful drainage” from the Plaintiffs’ lease in violation of federal and state law.

The Facts:

Breton Energy LLC and Conn Energy Inc. sued International Paper Co. and its successors in interest, consisting of eleven oil companies including Apache Corporation, Chevron and I.P. Petroleum Co. The Plaintiffs claimed specifically that IP Petroleum perforated and drained an oil reservoir under the Plaintiffs’ lease on the Outer Continental Shelf in the K-1 sands. The Plaintiffs also claimed that IP co-mingled resources from this reservoir with hydrocarbons from a nearby reservoir, making it impossible for the Plaintiffs to produce oil and gas from its own wells.The evidence showed that I P Petroleum, even though it had been ordered by the federal Minerals Mining Service not to complete wells in both the K-1 and K-2 sands, did in fact complete wells in both areas. There was also evidence that I P Petroleum’s production exceeded their estimate by almost 30%, which would make sense if they were producing from someone else’s reservoir as well as their own.

The District Court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claims, and they appealed to the Fifth Circuit.

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The Railroad Commission of Texas (the RRC) is planning to amend their permit rule for oil and gas pipelines. The section to be amended, section 3.70, involves the pipeline permit procedure. The RRC invited comments on the changes until August 25, 2014. The issue has become a hot topic, especially since Texas already has substantial case law on what constitutes a common carrier.

Current Texas Law

Texas law requires that to be considered a common carrier a pipeline must serve a “public purpose” in carrying products for third parties for compensation, as discussed in the Denbury Green opinion by the Supreme Court of Texas. (You can access my previous blog post about this case here). In the Denbury Green case, the Supreme Court said that when a landowner challenges a pipeline’s claim of common carrier status, the burden is on the pipeline company to prove it meets the definition of a common carrier.

The Texas Railroad Commission approved a substantial amendment to its oil and gas pipeline permit rule on December 2, 2014, and the amendment has major significance for Texas landowners and Texas mineral owners. The rule is Texas Railroad Commission Rule 3.70, and the amended rule goes into effect on March 1, 2015.

The Railroad Commission received a substantial amount of written comment from individuals, oil companies and trade organizations. Comment and testimony was also received at the public hearing on the proposed amendment held in Austin, Texas on September 22, 2014. The amended Rule 3.70 and the discussion of public comments by the Commission’s General Counsel can be accessed here.

The amended Rule 3.70 provides that each operator of a pipeline or gathering system (other than production lines or flow lines that are general confined to the leased premises) must obtain a permit from the Commission and renew the permit annually. The permit application must now include the following:

The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently published their decision in  Holt Texas, Limited and Transamerican Underground, Limited v. Stephen J. Zayler, a case which concerned a bankrupt oil and gas company. Holt Texas, Ltd. (“Holt”) and Transamerica Underground Limited (“TAUG”) who were subcontractors of the now bankrupt T.S.C. Seiber (“Seiber”) appealed the District Court’s judgment which in turn affirmed a Bankruptcy Court order. The District Court held that funds of an interpleader action filed by Encana Corporation (“EnCana”) were not property of Encana but property of the bankrupt company Seiber. On appeal, Holt and TAUG challenged the District and Bankruptcy Courts’ conclusions that first, the Texas Construction Trust Funds Act (“CTFA”) did not apply to these funds, and secondly, that Appellants did not have valid, perfected mineral liens on these funds under Chapter 56 of the Texas Property Code. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Background: In 2008 Encana engaged Seiber to build a natural gas pipeline in Robertson County, Texas. Holt and TAUG were the subcontractors; Holt provided heavy machinery and TAUG installed over two thousand feet of pipe. The agreement between Encana’s and Seiber specified that if a subcontractor was not paid by Seiber, Encana would be able to withhold all remaining sums and make no further payment to Seiber. In August 2009 TAUG notified Encana that it had not been paid recently, and would seek payment of the $96,3000 that TAUG claimed it was owed. In September 2009 Encana filed an interpleader in federal district court, paid $345,000.00 into that court’s registry and sought a declaration shielding it from any further liability for the unpaid amounts owed by Seiber. In October 2009 Seiber filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which was quickly converted to a Chapter 7 petition. TAUG then filed an Affidavit Claiming Mineral Lien against Encana’s property in November 2009. Holt filed its Affidavit Claiming Mineral Lien in March 2010. Encana was discharged from the interpleader in April 2012 and a discharge order was entered. The remaining parties filed competing motions for summary judgment: Holt and TAUG argued that two sets of Texas statutes (the Construction Trust Funds Act and the Texas mechanics lien statutes) that are intended to protect subcontractors require that the interpleader funds be awarded to them. The Bankruptcy Court held that neither law applied and that the interpleader funds were part of the bankruptcy estate of Seiber. Holt and TAUG appealed to the District Court, which affirmed the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court. Holt and TAUG then appealed to the Fifth Circuit.

Arguments: The Fifth Circuit discussed whether the interpled funds were property of the bankruptcy estate of Seiber or not. The opinion discussed that this question turns on who had legal possession of the funds after deposit into the registry of the court but before any action was taken by the court as to those funds. Chapter 56 of the Texas Property Code provides mineral subcontractors with a statutory lien “to secure payment for labor or services related to the mineral activities.” Tex. Prop. Code. §56.002. Chapter 162 of the Texas Property Code states that “Construction payments are trust funds under this chapter of the payments are made to a contractor or subcontractor … under a construction contract for the improvement of specific real property in this state.” Tex. Prop. Code §162.001(a). Section 162 protects subcontractors without requiring notice or other action by the subcontractor, such as sending a notice or filing an affidavit.

Recently the Fifth U.S. Court of Appeals issued an interesting decision in the case of Warren et al. v. Chesapeake. This very important case for Texas mineral owners is based on a lawsuit against Chesapeake Exploration for what the Plaintiffs claimed was the wrongful deduction of post-production costs from the Plaintiffs’ gas royalty payments.

The Facts

The Warren case involves three oil and gas leases in Texas. Charles and Robert Warren entered into leases with FSOC Gas Co. Ltd. Those leases were then assigned to Chesapeake, who used an affiliate, Chesapeake Operating, to drill and operate the wells. Chesapeake deducted post-production costs from the royalty payments to the Warrens as well as from royalties to Abdul and Joan Javeed who joined the case as plaintiffs later. Chesapeake claimed that the leases authorized the deductions. The Plaintiffs asserted that Chesapeake breached the leases because the deductions did not comply with the lease provisions on calculating royalties. The complaint also included class action allegations on behalf of other royalty owners with similar leases with Chesapeake Exploration.